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ON ECCENTRIC
CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCEt
WILLIAM

D.

VALENTE*

The performance of the United States Supreme Court in adjudicating
matters of major concern has proven no less controversial today than it did
in the days of John Marshall. The assignment of political jurisdiction
among the branches of the federal government, so urgently debated in the
Federalist Papers, was recently contested with equal vigor in connection
with the Watergate exposes, impoundment of congressional appropriations, and covert operations in foreign affairs. In these areas, the Supreme
Court and subordinate federal courts have managed to fashion decisions
which are consistent with constitutional tradition and precedent. In cases
under the fourteenth amendment challenging police power legislation by
the states, however, both the Warren and Burger Courts have had more
difficult sailing. The modern Court has devised novel approaches and potent doctrines of its own, resulting in wholesale facial nullification of state
laws. This expansive constitutionalism espoused by the Court has drawn
a fire of criticism.
The public controversies and discord within the legal profession renew
fundamental arguments on the role of the Supreme Court in our legal
system. The Court's responsibility has been placed in question by charges
of excessive activism and a lack of consistency in its uses of new creative
devices. The trend toward constitutionalizing sensitive areas of social and
familial relationships, thereby cutting away traditional state legislative
controls, has been deplored by several Justices and by substantial segments of the legal profession. Underlying these criticisms of the Court's
function are the more basic and difficult issues regarding the decisional
modes by which it rationalizes case results. The issue is not the power of
the Court to find new constitutional immunities, with concurrent displacement or shrinkage of state legislative controls, but whether the Court has
pressed that power to extremes that are neither necessitated nor warranted
by the Constitution. We all recognize that every faction will, at one time
t This paper is based upon the address delivered by Professor William D. Valente to the
American Justinian Society of Jurists in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on November 15, 1975.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University Law School. A.B. 1947, J.D. 1949, University of
Pennsylvania.

21

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

SUMMER

1975

or another, disapprove of particular decisions as antimajoritarian judicial
legislation; however, the lathering over judicial revisions of entire classes
of laws cannot be tossed off as the idle cranks of pedagogues, ideologues,
or frustrated litigants. Chiding dissents within the Court are also a hallmark of its current work. When rendered by such able and diverse jurists
as the late Justices Black and Harlan, and supplemented by formally
voiced disapprobation of national associations of state jurists, it is clear
that deeper jurisprudential issues underlie such protests.
There is reason to doubt that the Justices have given consistent study
and reflection to root problems of judicial process in the constitutional
sphere. Chief Justice Burger's generous criticism of the poor training and
performance of court lawyers might well have conceded a similar lack of
training and insight into the judicial process and into the long-range implications of isolated constitutional decisions. In Lemon v. Kurtzman' the
Chief Justice certainly played loosely with constitutional reasoning when
he converted his own dicta in Walz v. Tax Commission,2 regarding the
broad policy of nonentanglement of government with religion, into a new,
independent test of establishment of religion to invalidate government
assistance to nonpublic schools. What is more surprising is that he should
3
his brethren
register shock a few years later when, in Meek v. Pittenger,
should invoke his own entanglement dicta to nullify publicly administered
therapeutic services to children attending parish schools. A decent caution
in issuing constitutional pronouncements would certainly have avoided
this implanting of broad dicta into constitutional concrete. Former Justices have long warned that a figure of speech is a poor foundation for
constitutional principle.' The Chief Justice is in for another surprise since
his belief in Roe v. Wade5 that the Court was not sanctioning abortion on
demand is fast being disproved by current developments.
Only history will tell whether the Warren and Burger Courts have
been off the center of their own institutional heritage; whether they failed,
with sufficient rigor, to maintain a fair balance between social stability
and disruption in generating constitutional innovations; and, whether,
especially on policy questions that ultimately rest more on sociopolitical
preference than clear constitutional purpose, they have been too casual in
1 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

421 U.S. 349 (1975).
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting), Justice Reed noted that "[a] rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), the then Judge Cardozo
warned that "[mletaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."
1 410 U.S. 113, 208 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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overriding judgments that are primarily entrusted by our Constitution to
elected legislatures. Why does the modern Court provoke such criticism?
Certainly not for lack of technical knowledge. Rather, there is evidence,
among both allegedly liberal and conservative Justices, of failing in the
crunch, when personal feelings run strong, to confine the boundaries of
their constitutional discretion. The Court must make value judgments in
constitutional litigation, but the method by which these are made must
be harnessed by a rational, institutional jurisprudence if the Court is not
to slide into idiosyncratic rulings. Being nonelected and far removed from
local circumstances, the Court needs more than idealistic libertarian or
conservative urges to legitimize its raw power to disrupt official arrangements and to impose, as in Miranda v. Arizona6 and Doe v. Bolton,7 detailed series of rules that partake more of a legislative code than a judicial
decision.
By this time, you will have assuredly inferred my disapproval of the
constitutional jurisprudence, or lack thereof, in which the majority of Justices have indulged these past 20 years. I must now take up the burden of
providing some specifics to justify my position, and these specifics center
on three elements of process which distinguish the modern Court. First, the
Court has been too ready to nullify statutes and ordinances on their face
and too prone to forego the narrower alternative of curing particular evils
by limiting decisions to the constitutionality of a law's application.The
approach of limiting decisions to a particular application, while seeking a
saving or narrowed construction of the statute in question, would avoid
chopping away gaps in a connected system of laws, would support legislative efforts, and would furnish more positive constitutional guidance to the
nation's officials. Narrowed decision is not always possible, but the Court's
uneven choice from case to case between facial nullification and nullification of specific application supports the suspicion that personal judicial
bias has not been as restrained as it should be. Since Marbury v. Madison'
the Court has acknowledged the fundamental proposition that constitutional adjudication is warranted only when necessitated by an actual controversy, and then only to the extent required to resolve that concrete case.
The modern Court has, in my view, devalued that concept even while
paying it lip service.
My second point, related to the first, is that the constitutional tests
fashioned by the modern Court are unstable and heighten, rather than
minimize, subjective judgments. Examples lie in the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth which, in the hands of the Court, have themselves
become somewhat vague and overbroad. The limits of these due process
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

' 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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tests can only be gauged by the individual Justices, for no Justice has ever
ventured an objective standard of language clarity or of legislative classification. Perfect clarity or classification through an objective standard is not
possible. Only the perceptions of individual Justices determine how much
imperfection of clarity or scope of coverage is constitutionally tolerable
from one class of case to the next. Such appraisals are further complicated
and rendered even more crucial under the equal protection tests of rational
classification and strict scrutiny. These tests are mutually exclusive;
hence, to determine which one applies, the Court must first decide whether
or not the alleged constitutional interest is "fundamental," and such a
judicial finding well-nigh preordains the final outcome. Where the Court
elevates an aggrieved interest to the fundamental category, its strict scrutiny test provides the constitutional sledge hammer to accomplish the
wholesale destruction of similar laws in every state of the nation. Since
liberals and conservatives have been equally disappointed by the Court's
ranking of fundamental and nonfundamental interests, the divergent equal
protection tests are bound to foment uncertainty and litigation in most
major areas of social legislation. When to this is added the latest gambit,
nullifying laws in the guise of a due process prohibition of irrebuttable
presumptions, which itself is only another way of expressing judicial disapproval of a legislative classification, 9 you have a truly formidable arsenal
of judicial weapons with which to attack legislative discretion.
The vagueness doctrine has also been trotted out or avoided by the
Court at will. When of a mind to save a statute, the Court has, by saving
construction, supplied constitutionally fatal omissions. When disinclined
to save other statutes, however, it has declined to engage in saving or
narrowing construction. Thus, in Screws v. United States'" the Court preserved a civil rights criminal statute by reading in the necessary scienter
requirement, but declined to read in the necessary scienter requirement in
the obscenity cases." This past term the Court was asked, in Wood v.
Strickland,2 to construe a civil rights statute as providing immunity to
school authorities from liability for good faith, nonmalicious disciplinary
action which, on hindsight, courts find to violate a student's civil rights.
After conceding that the scope of immunity issue was one of discretionary
policy, the Court refused to recognize such immunity unless the disciplinarian reasonably believed that he was acting constitutionally. Common
sense is ruffled by the Court's notion that defamation of public figures, no
matter how gross, damaging, or negligent, is constitutionally immune if
I See Note, IrrebuttablePresumptions:An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).

10325 U.S. 91 (1945).

1 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
12 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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not proven to be actually intentional or wanton, 3 while the good faith
imposition of school discipline, however well intended, is not within the
scope of common law or statutory immunity. To the man in the street, the
Court's heavenly remedial concepts are not of this world, but of a paradise
lost.
The third systemic hazard of the Court's process arises from the selective employment of the strict scrutiny and rational basis tests. Their use
is pegged not to any particular constitutional clause, but to the Court's
valuations of different interests. The degree of sympathy which the Court
brings to each particular interest is the bellwether for predicting how it will
use these tests. Consider the penumbral right of privacy. It provides protection from official regulation of marital contraception," home-consumed
obscenity, 5 and, according to some Justices, distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried minors.'" The privacy of families and nearby nonpatrons of
drive-in theatres, however, is not protected from nude movie scenes projected beyond the confines of unshielded drive-in movies.'7 In addition, per
the Supreme Court, the penumbral right to travel ranks as fundamental,' 8
but the claims of poverty groups against discrimination in educational
expenditures do not.'9 I cite these instances not to appraise the soundness
of each decision, but to question whether the Court's interpretive devices
are truly rational and consistent with "the Blessings of Liberty. ' '20
Concern with the Court's work is particularly acute in the areas of
social regulation of sexuality and familial relations. In Roe v. Wade,2' the
Court decriminalized abortion by a substantive due process rationale
which it had long condemned.2 Far more egregious, however, was the
Court's accompanying decision in Doe v. Bolton,21 which declared that the
Constitution prohibits, beyond the narrow limits set down by the Court,
legislative oversight of abortions conducted by physicians and hospitals.
Most state legislatures had determined that the dangers posed by quack
or prostitute doctors or clinics was sufficiently serious to justify special
regulation; yet, this essentially legislative policy judgment was held to be
constitutionally impermissible. By specifying with particularity what a
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
" See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'7 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S.
313 (1972) (per curiam).
" See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
" See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
'
"

'

U.S. CONST. preamble.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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state legislature could and could not regulate in the field, the Court effectively preempted the field in the name of questionable constitutional readings. Little wonder that the Court was suspected of having an effusive,
nonconstitutional faith that doctors, once licensed, can do no wrong. The
lifelong association of Justices Burger and Black with medical clients,
which more sensitive jurists would have found restraining, provides a psychological explanation of their performance, but no such conditioning
could explain the temerity of the remaining Justices in foreclosing legislative alternatives at the very time that abortion laws had been or were being
reconsidered by state legislators across the land. 4 Such activism
undermines credibility and confidence in a purportedly dispassionate
search for constitutional limits and raises the suspicion that particular
interests are wired to the Court's gut rather than its intellect.
In social cost, the fallout of Wade and Bolton, as they affect putative
fathers or parents of unmarried minors, 5 and private medical institutions
opposed to abortion-on-demand," will be with us for years to come. It will
agitate political divisions because the immunity from criminal prosecution
is claimed to give rise to a "right" to taxpayer subsidy of elective abortions.27 Would a wiser Court have left such complex matters to interstitial
legislative correction, rather than attempt a wholesale political solution in
the name of its own absolutes? Constitutional dogmatism does violence to
the fundamental tenet of our pluralist democracy: that the law should
maximize conflicting social wants through representative processes. Moreover, article III of the Constitution was not adopted to empower the Court
2
to break every political deadlock on the anvil of the Constitution. 8
The abortion cases are not an isolated frolic. By handcuffing legislative regulation of distribution of contraceptives to unmarried minors in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,21 the Court undercut police powers concerning youth.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973).
See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd sub nor. Poe v. Gerstein,
517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), appeal docketed sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3319
(U.S. Nov. 14, 1975) (No. 75-713) (state requirement that spouse of married woman or parent
of minor consent to abortion held unconstitutional). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo.), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
26 Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973). See Taylor v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973).
" See, e.g., Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.), vacated, 505 F.2d 186 (2d Cir.
1974); Doe v. Rose, 380 F. Supp. 779 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974).
28 Justice Frankfurter, and before him Justices Holmes and Brandeis, thought the
Court most grievously abused its power in the first third of this century when it
substituted its judgment for that of legislatures on social and economic matters-striking down a law against child labor, for example. They might have felt
the same way in the recent abortion cases, for there again the justices dealt with
an issue outside their own special competence and experience.
Lewis, Most Priceless Asset, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1974, at 29, col. 1, col. 2.
- 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2
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The results speak far more eloquently than apologetic dicta, especially
when opinions have the flavor of a law school exercise where the professor
(the Court) keeps telling the struggling students (the legislatures) that he
or she did it wrong, but seldom supplies any guidance other than a poor
grade.
The Court's ad hoc imposition of fluid procedural due process standards is also beginning to confound local administration of public schools.
This past term, in Goss v. Lopez, the Court ruled that a public school
student could not be suspended-even for one day-without a disciplinary
hearing. The formality of such hearings was left for the schoolmen to judge,
the Court indicating only that the process which is due depends on the
degree of discipline to be imposed. Schoolmen, as well as lawyers, must
now be charged with knowledge of the fine points of constitutional law in
carrying out their official responsibilities, and they run the risk of civil
damages, under Wood v. Strickland," for unintentional mistakes which a
court deems unreasonable. Constitutionalizing even minor aspects of public regulation is, I submit, an unrealistic ritual and not very productive for
either liberty or order.
The wreckage of the Court's obscenity decisions requires no comment,
but the latest decision in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville" confirms the
poverty of reasoning in this area. There, the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting projection of nude movie scenes from massive, unshielded, drive-in theatre screens out to the neighborhood and view of the
nonpatron public. The legislative interest in promoting traffic safety by
suppressing distractions to motorists was acknowledged, but averted on
the ground that only nude scenes were proscribed. The Court apparently
rejected the legislative judgment that nude scenes were significantly more
likely to distract, or distract for a longer duration, than other movie scenes.
With respect to the protection of neighboring families and children from
offensive displays, the Court decided that the burden fell upon the viewers
to avert their eyes. Such gratuitous prescriptions descend to the absurd in
view of the fact that there was no censoring of the patrons or of the movie
itself-only the requirement that the exhibitor bear the economic cost of
doing business by confining the show to his theater, either by relocating
the screen or erecting appropriate visual barriers. The Court may as well
have told the residents not to look north or south and to put blinders on
their children. This subordination of traffic safety and home-dwellers' privacy to economic interests in the name of an insubstantial, almost theoretical interest in expression smacks of dogmatism and illustrates how the
3 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
31

420 U.S. 308 (1975).

2 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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Court has trapped itself, and society, by hypertechnical exposition of constitutional tests of its own making. The Erznoznik case is more expressive
of visceral reflex than of rational analysis.
If legislation continues to be tested on technical racks that can be
arbitrarily tightened or loosened, with no cohesive rationale, the drafting
of legislation becomes more an adventure than a political exercise and the
adjustable calipers of vagueness, overbreadth, underinclusiveness, and
compelling state interest tend to become not objective measures, but instruments of will for a five-man majority. Hard cases created by legislative
default, as with racial segregation and legislative malapportionment, may
require strong constitutional medicine where an extreme social necessity
arises, but the bulk of the Court's rulings cannot be justified by a plea of
necessity.
How, then, shall jurisprudential balance be reclaimed? Only the Court
can do that, but the example of respected predecessors and the pressure
of continuing professional criticism may influence a return to judicial discipline and self-mastery. Men like Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, and Hand
did not simplify complex social facts, embrace unverified assumptions, or
loosely indulge in judicial notice to resolve competing interests. They were
willing, but cautious, to contravene inadmissible legislative actions in the
awareness that their own predilections were not always correct. They attempted strenuously to distinguish between creative elaboration of constitutional values and the influence of personal sociological bias. They eschewed facial nullification where less disruptive remedies could be found
and disavowed technical doctrines which tend to make legislation suspect
at the very threshold of judicial review. They limited constitutional adjudication to cases presenting only substantial constitutional interests and
favored postponement of such adjudication when legislative correction was
a reasonable alternative. They did not favor overwritten opinions in which
a reader could not separate the "big" from the "little" dicta. And finally
they strove for clarity, utility, and continuity in both the content and
expression of their opinions and sought to tailor doctrinal pronouncements
to clearly foreseeable circumstances.
The writings of Justice Frankfurter, Judge Traynor, and Professor
Paul Freund provide some useful referents. Justice Frankfurter noted that
"the only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication
and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and
instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so.''13 In commenting upon
the performance of former Justices, Justice Frankfurter also pronounced
guidelines for the present Court:
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 535
(1947).

3
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Their [Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo] opinions do not disclose a private
attitude for or against extension of governmental authority by legislation
...
. [Holmes'] private feelings did not lead him to invoke the rule of
indefiniteness to invalidate legislation of which he strongly disapproved
34

Professor Freund has remarked that creative ambiguity can set the
direction but not the limit for the growth of an area of the law and that
the judge must face the question of how far he should go in articulating a
new position. 35 "Intuitive leaps" are no substitute for the hard answers to
this question. Only if these admonitions are followed can one conclude with
Judge Traynor that:
Although the judge's predilections may play a part in setting the initial
direction he takes toward the creative solution, there is little danger of their
determining the solution itself, however much it bears the stamp of his individual workmanship. Our great creative judges have been men of outstanding
skill, adept at discounting their own predilections and careful to discount
them with conscientious severity. . . . Thereafter the opinion must pass
muster with scholars and practitioners . . ..
The legal realist seeking the constitutional "quick-fix" tends to sacrifice all safeguards of constitutional structure and theory to the immediate
desired goal in a particular case.
It is usually easier to learn how to employ the weapon of powerful processes
than it is to learn when and why to use, or not to use them. So in the fields
of social organization and structure it is easier to learn how to use courts and
constitutions to get quick results than it is to learn when to resort to them,
and why they should not be used routinely. 7
That temptation, ever present, must also be ever discountenanced by attorneys and judges, as well as by the Supreme Court, if we are to nourish
a government of laws and not of men.
11Id. at 531.
3' Freund, Rationality in Judicial Decisions, in NoMos VII:
Friedrich ed. 1964).

RATIONAL DECISION 109, 118 (C.

"' Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL

TOMORROW 48, 52 (M.G. Paulsen ed. 1959).
11Young, "Interesting Times" for School Administrators, 4
(1974).
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